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Abstract 
The functioning of commodity markets has changed related to processes of financialization 
that involve two major developments – the rise of financial interest on commodity derivative 
markets through the increasing presence of financial investors and the changing business 
models of international commodity trading houses and the increasing importance of these 
markets in price setting and risk management since the liberalization of national commodity 
sectors. A critical question is how these global financialization processes affect commodity 
producers in low income countries via the operational dynamics of global commodity chains 
and distinct national market structures. This paper investigates how global financialization 
processes influence how prices are set and transmitted and how risks are distributed and 
managed in the cotton sectors in Burkina Faso, Mozambique and Tanzania. It concludes 
that uneven exposure to price instability and access to price risk management have im-
portant distributional implications. Whilst international traders have the capacity to deal with 
price risks through hedging in addition to expanding their profit possibilities through financial 
activities on commodity derivative markets, local actors in producer countries face the chal-
lenge of price instability and increased short-termism – albeit to different extents deepening 
on local market structures – with limited access to risk management.  
 
Keywords:  commodity markets, financialization, global commodity chains, commodity 
prices, price risks, price risk management, cotton sector, Africa 
  
  Research  5 
1. Introduction 
The unprecedented commodity price rise and heightened volatility since 2003 has reignited 
academic and political discussions on the drivers of commodity prices and their conse-
quences for commodity dependent developing countries. Persistently rising commodity pric-
es appeared to some as a reversal of the Prebish-Singer thesis and a shift in development 
thinking on the relationship between commodity dependence and economic growth and de-
velopment. Some questioned whether “commodities are still in crisis” (Sapsford et al. 2010), 
echoing the seminal work of Alfred Maizels (1992). Related to this, scholars and policy mak-
ers have promoted the notion of resource based industrialisation via upgrading along global 
value chains (Morris et al. 2012; UNECA 2013). 
But, it is not only commodity price dynamics, in and of themselves, but also broader changes 
in the functioning of commodity markets that have had crucial impacts on commodity pro-
ducers in low income countries (LICs). These changes can be understood as part of the pro-
cess of financialization as a central process in contemporary capitalism (Fine 2010; Lapa-
vitsas 2014; Van der Zwan 2014). Financialization is frequently defined as ‘the increasing 
role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the 
operation of the domestic and international economies’ (Epstein 2005, 3). In the case of in-
ternational commodity markets, financialization has occurred via the increasing interaction, 
or symbiosis, between financial and physical markets for commodities. Both the financializa-
tion of households and firms, driven by a process of withdrawal of the state from provisions 
for health, social security and old age, and the falling rate of profit in industry, respectively, 
have promoted financial investment in general and the rise of commodities as an asset class 
in portfolio investment in particular (Domanski/Heath 2007). 
Connected to the rise of financial interest on international commodity derivative markets are 
at least two major developments in the structure and functioning of international commodity 
markets. First, the increasing importance of international commodity exchanges, i.e. com-
modity futures markets, in price setting and risk management since the collapse of the Inter-
national Commodity Agreements (ICAs) and the liberalization of national commodity sectors. 
And second, a shift in the business models of international commodity trading houses to-
wards financial motives and activities, reflected in the restructuring of commodity trading 
companies to place “risk management” at the centre of their core competencies, namely in-
house research departments and futures brokerages that cater to traders of physical com-
modities as well as financial investors looking to diversify their portfolios. Commodity trading 
houses thus play the dual role of physical commodity trader and financial investor on com-
modity exchanges (Newman 2009). 
A critical question, that this paper seeks to investigate, is how processes of financialization 
affect commodity producers in LICs via the operational dynamics of global commodity chains 
and their distributional outcomes. While there is now a large, often quantitative, literature on 
the implications of financialization on commodity prices with contradictory results (for an 
overview see UNCTAD 2011; Ederer et al. 2013), there is limited analysis of how financiali-
zation dynamics impact along particular commodity chains. This is related to the division of 
literature on financial markets and the financial dimension of price transmission at the inter-
national level on the one side and on commodity chains analysing impacts on producers on 
the other side (Bargawi/Newman 2013; Clapp/Helleiner 2012). Commodity chain research, 
together with global value chain and global production network research, has analysed the 
organisation and governance of international trade and global production and how this af-
fects the development prospects of producers, firms, regions and countries. However, re-
search has largely neglected the role of finance and financial markets, and in particular fi-
nancialization, in shaping the structure and functioning of commodity chains and the out-
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comes for different actors along chains (see below for notable exceptions). In light of this 
analytical gap, particularly scholars working in the global production network tradition have 
begun to incorporate issues of financialization into their frameworks (Coe et al 2014; Yeung/ 
Coe 2015). This paper contributes to this burgeoning debate focusing on the cotton sector in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
Although world cotton production is dominated by the US and China (the largest producer), 
the sector plays an important role in LICs in SSA as a major source of foreign exchange 
earnings and important contributor to GDP (gross domestic product). Along with coffee, cot-
ton is the most important export cash crop (followed by sugar, oil seeds, nuts, tea and spic-
es), and accounted for 10.5 per cent of total SSA agricultural exports in 2013. More im-
portantly, cotton production generates income for millions of small holder farmers and rural 
households. There are, however, fundamental differences in the relative economic im-
portance of cotton production with cotton enjoying an economic importance in West and 
Central Africa (WCA) far exceeding that in East and Southern Africa (ESA) (Gibbon 2001). 
This is also seen in the three countries studied in this paper where cotton accounts for 17.7 
per cent of exports in Burkina Faso, 2.5 per cent in Mozambique and 2.3 per cent in Tanza-
nia in 2013. The sectors provides the most important source of livelihoods to around 350,000 
farmers in Burkina Faso, 250,000 in Mozambique and 425,000 in Tanzania, and many more 
indirectly.  
This paper investigates the question of how financialization affects the institutional context of 
price setting and hence how prices are “set” in the process of international cotton trade 
where global price benchmarks, those arising on commodity derivative markets in particular, 
have become increasingly influential. We are particularly interested in the distributional im-
plications of these changes in price “setting” in SSA cotton exporters that work through inter-
actions between prices, price risks and price risk management (PRM) strategies. Interna-
tional commodity trading houses have a crucial role in this process as lead firms in cotton 
commodity chains. Newman (2009) showed how the trading practices of international traders 
on coffee markets critically influence how financialization dynamics impact upon local ex-
porters and producers – through the price benchmarks and the types of contracts they use, 
and the way they deal with price risks and expand their core activities and profit possibilities.  
Global financialization dynamics and institutional contexts and lead firm strategies interact 
with local contexts, i.e. national market structures, which influence the way in which prices, 
instability and risks and opportunities to pursue PRM are transferred along cotton commodity 
chains to producers. The three country case studies analysed in this paper owe to these 
differences in their national market structures and the level of state involvement in cotton 
production and marketing. Burkina Faso, Mozambique and Tanzania have pursued different 
reform agendas since the 1990s and these differences have conditioned the way in which 
global financialization dynamics play out in each of the national systems.  
The paper is based on trade, industry and financial data, interviews with international com-
modity traders, financial investors and cotton associations, and fieldwork in Burkina Faso 
(September 2014) and Mozambique (November 2014). During fieldwork, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with ginners, ginners’ associations, farmers’ organizations, rele-
vant government institutions, and sector experts.1 For Tanzania fieldwork was conducted in 
2007 interviewing diverse actors in the sector with selected additional telephone interviews 
conducted with ginners in early 2015.  
 
                                                            
1  In Burkina Faso and Mozambique, we conducted interviews with seven ginners, two spinners, two input providers, farmers’ 
unions and ginners’ associations. We also interviewed representatives of the Ministries of Trade and Agriculture and of in-
ternational institutions, and local researchers and experts. 
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2. Financialization of Commodity Markets and  
Global Commodity Chains 
In its broadest sense, financialization describes the increasing role and dominance of finan-
cial motives, activities and profits for non-financial corporations and in the economy and so-
ciety more widely (Epstein 2005). Recent research has focused on the magnitude of finan-
cial activities as sources of profit in the economy and on new opportunities for the expropria-
tion of profits by different types of actors (Newman 2009). Financialization has affected most 
sectors of the economy including commodity markets.  
International commodity markets have become financialized in at least two major respects: 
The first involves the increasing importance of financial markets for firms’ decision making 
around the allocation of resources. The seminal work of Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) has 
inspired a large body of recent work on the financialization of the non-financial corporation. 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan elucidated the shift from ‘old economy’ or ‘productionist’ business 
models, based upon a strategy of ‘retain and reinvest’, to a ‘new economy’ model with firms’ 
veracious pursuit of profit increasingly delinked from investment in production. Rather, strat-
egies to increase share prices through firm restructuring along the lines of ‘downsize and 
distribute’, engagement in share buy-backs and short-term investment in financial markets 
have dominated. In the context of commodity markets, derivatives markets have served as a 
lucrative site for financialized accumulation for international commodity trading houses since 
the collapse of the ICAs and the liberalisation of national commodity marketing structures. 
There is considerable variation but several large international traders have their own finan-
cial services units or hedge funds, investing on their own account, managing third party 
money, and selling investment products. Such traders have become “financialized” and in-
creasingly resemble financial holding companies dealing with a wide spectrum of financial 
services and investments. While the proportion of company revenues coming from such fi-
nancial activities has remained relatively small and variable, they have grown with respect to 
revenues derived directly from the trading of physical commodities (Newman 2009).2 
Second, and connected to the first, is the increase in activity on international commodity ex-
changes driven purely by financial interests. Initially, commodity derivative markets were 
developed primarily to allow the management of risks for physical commodity traders but 
they have increasingly become dominated by traders outside physical commodity markets, 
particularly financial investors. Speculators have always played a role in these markets tak-
ing opposite positions to physical hedgers but they were largely specialized in the trading of 
few commodities. Financial investors, in contrast, trade in a large range of commodities as 
an asset class in order to derive profits from price changes – similar to stocks, bonds and 
real estate assets (Nissanke 2011; UNCTAD 2011). The 1990s saw an increase in hedge 
funds active on commodity exchanges as barriers were lowered with the transition from open 
outcry to electronic trading platforms. More recently, and connected to the withdrawal of the 
state in provisions for old age and social security, large institutional investors, pension funds 
in particular, have flooded commodity derivatives markets. Further, investment banks have 
increasingly offered diverse products for commodity derivative market investments to allow 
their clients to profit from commodity price developments, in addition to trading on their own 
account. This has increased in particular after the dot-com crises and in the context of the 
global economic crisis as investors searched for new investment opportunities.  
These changes have had a profound impact upon the relationship between financial and 
physical markets for commodities, in particular via the growing centrality of derivatives mar-
                                                            
2  Gibbon (2014) underlines that although financial activities’ contribution to revenues may be small, their potential contribu-
tion to profits can be much higher with shares up to 25 per cent between 2004 and 2008. 
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kets for risk management and price setting on physical markets. This increasing interaction 
between financial and physical commodity markets has also implications for the organisation 
and functioning of commodity chains and the development prospects of producers, firms, 
regions and countries as they are differentially integrated along these chains. 
Global commodity chain research – and global value chain and global production network 
research more broadly – has analysed the organisation and governance of international 
trade and global production. The focus has been on the organisational and geographical 
distribution of activities, costs and rewards along chains, highlighting the asymmetric power 
structure among actors and the prospects and limits for economic and more recently social 
upgrading (e.g. Gereffi 1994, 1995; Gereffi et al. 2001; Kaplinsky/Morris 2001; Henderson et 
al. 2002; Gibbon/Ponte 2005; Barrientos et al. 2010). Save for a few notable exceptions (i.e. 
Gibbon 2002; Palpacuer et al. 2005; Palpacuer 2008; Milberg 2008; Milberg/Winkler 2010; 
Baud/Durand 2012; Coe et al. 2014; Morgan 2014; Yeung/Coe 2015; Fernandez 2015; and 
specifically for commodity markets Newman 2009; Bargawi/Newman 2013; Clapp 2014), 
research to date has largely neglected the role of finance and financial markets, and in par-
ticular financialization, in shaping the structure and functioning of commodity chains and the 
outcomes for different chain actors. 
At the same time, the explosion of empirical research on financialization since the global 
economic crisis has tended to be conducted at the level of the nation state (utilising methods 
such as flow-of-funds analysis) or the non-financial corporation (analysis of firms’ balance 
sheets) or focused upon the operations of the financial sector itself. Analysis has often 
missed the integrated nature of financialization processes across national boundaries as 
financialized business strategies in one firm, sector or nation state impact through economic 
relationships across national boundaries under a system of globalized production. 
How the processes of financialization are played out along commodity chains depends criti-
cally on the horizontal and vertical market structure at each node of the chain and the institu-
tional and regulatory context in which commodity chains are embedded. In this paper, we 
take a chain approach that focuses specifically on how financialized accumulation strategies 
of commodity trading houses have affected the nature of price formation, transmission and 
PRM along commodity chains as these processes are mediated by national specificities in 
producer countries. We trace the process of price formation from futures markets, upstream 
along the chain from international traders, via exporters in producer countries and the local 
marketing system that connects producers with exporters. In doing so, we are able to con-
nect global processes of financialization to local outcomes in commodity producing countries 
and make inferences on the impact of these processes on the distribution of income and risk 
along commodity chains. 
3. Financialization and Cotton Markets 
As in other commodity sectors, these financialization dynamics are also seen in the cotton 
sector, involving in particular two aspects – first, the increasing prominence of financial mo-
tives in cotton trading through the dominant role of financial investors on cotton derivative 
markets and the dual role of large international cotton traders as both hedger and speculator 
and, second, the increasing importance of commodity derivative markets in cotton price for-
mation and PRM. 
The presence of financial investors on commodity derivative markets has led to a sharp rise 
in trading volumes and open interest positions and to an increasing variety of investment 
products and strategies (Heumesser/Staritz 2013). For cotton, total open positions of futures 
and option contracts (long and short) have increased importantly since the early 2000s – 
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albeit with large fluctuations – along an increase in the share of financial investors fluctuating 
around 60 per cent from 2006 to 2015 (Figure 1).There is a large and controversial literature 
on the effects of financial investors on commodity prices3 (for an overview, see Ederer et al. 
2013) but less so on their impact on the structure and the functioning of commodity deriva-
tive markets. In the cotton market, trading strategies of financial investors together with elec-
tronic trading, extended trading hours and new investment products have increased speed, 
complexity and short-termism of derivatives trading – with intra-day volatility being a rather 
new phenomenon. These changes make trading more flexible and allow for immediate reac-
tions but also demand continuous awareness of the market. Financial investors’ behaviour is 
closely analysed by physical cotton traders and taken into account in their trading strategies 
as otherwise they may position themselves “against the market”. Hence, physical traders 
look not only at fundamentals but also try to anticipate the factors that determine financial 
investors’ decisions. As one trader interviewed by UNCTAD (2011: 44) put it “the banks are 
trying to understand our markets and we try to understand their markets”. 
 
Figure 1:  Open positions (left axes) and share of financial investors (right axes) in ICE cotton 
futures and options  
 
 
Source: CFTC. 
Note: Until 2006 data on commercial and non-commercial traders was reported with the large share of index investors/swap 
dealers being part of the commercial trader category. Hence, the share of non-commercials under represents the share of 
financial investors. From 2006 onwards, swap dealers and money managers have been reported separately which are jointly 
shown in the financial investor category.   
                                                            
3  An increasing amount of research shows that trading strategies of financial investors, in particular money managers em-
ploying trend following strategies (in contrast to swap dealers/index investors employing generally long-only and longer 
term trading strategies), have had a distorting effect on short term price developments and increased the amplitudes and 
speed of price changes. However, fundamental and speculative factors are often intertwined which makes disentangling 
them difficult. 
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But large physical traders, particularly multinational commodity trading houses have also 
changed their corporate strategies with an increasing focus on financial motives. There is 
variation and particularly traditional cotton commodity traders such as Reinhart and Plexus 
and smaller traders more generally have remained focused on physical trading activities. But 
the increased role of large multi-commodity trading companies in the cotton sector4, particu-
larly in the context of tightened credit conditions and declining cotton demand during the 
global economic crisis, has led to financial trading strategies becoming more dominant 
alongside traditional physical commodity related hedging activities. The top three cotton 
traders, Louis Dreyfus, Cargill and Olam, have risk management and fund management as 
part of their business activities. Louis Dreyfus has an own asset management unit – called 
Edesia – that was formed in 2008 to develop and manage alternative investment products 
for a wide range of institutional clients (Louis Dreyfus 2015). In addition, the Louis Dreyfus 
Commodities Alpha Fund, a hedge fund with $2.4bn. in assets under management in 2012 
and the Eifel Investment Group, were part of the trading company (Gibbon 2014). Cargill has 
opened and reorganized at least five financial subsidiaries, some of which are involved in 
commodities markets (Oxfam 2011). They provide risk management and investment prod-
ucts for their own business units and external clients, including producers, pension funds, 
hedge funds and endowment communities (Vander Stichele 2012). They own Black River 
Asset Management – a commodity-related hedge and private equity fund with estimated 
assets of $5.9 bn. in 2013, Cargill Risk Management providing various customized invest-
ment products, Cargill Trade and Structured Finance with a portfolio of $450 mln. and Car-
Val Investors, an independently-managed alternative investment fund with $10bn. in assets 
under management (Cargill 2015; Gibbon 2014). Olam International started the business 
segment “commodity financial services” in 2003 which has been operated as the subsidiary 
Invenio since 2010. It has three core business areas: market making and volatility trading, 
risk management solutions, and fund management. Olam created the Relative Value Com-
modity Fund (the Ektimo RV Fund) in July 2010. Further fund strategies are scheduled for 
the coming years (Olam 2014).  
Regarding price formation, global cotton prices are derived from the Cotlook A-index and 
cotton futures prices at the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) in New York where the major 
cotton futures and options contracts are traded. Prices in physical cotton contracts vary be-
cause of differences in quality, location, delivery schedule, local supply and demand condi-
tions and bargaining power. But these two international prices are used as a reference in 
physical trade, being the most important factors in the determination of the price of cotton. 
The Cotlook A-index is compiled daily by Cotton Outlook, a private company in Liverpool, by 
collecting quotations from cotton traders.5 Cotton futures prices are established throughout 
the trading day based on trading activities at the ICE. ICE futures contracts are limited to the 
delivery of U.S. cotton to U.S. locations and, hence, reflect primarily U.S. conditions.6 De-
spite substantial basis risk, they are used as a global benchmark. The two prices are highly 
correlated particularly as traders take into account ICE closing prices for their quotations. 
The correlation between the monthly returns of the Cotlook A-index and of the nearby ICE 
futures contract between 1999 and 2007 accounted for 85 per cent which increased to 91 
per cent for the period 2008 to April 2015. An analysis of daily cotton prices shows that the 
magnitude of futures prices pass-through on the Cotlook A-index has increased indicating 
                                                            
4 This trend is also visible with the arrival of Glencore Xstrata (although with small volumes), the world’s largest commodity 
trader, to the relatively small cotton scene (Meyer 2010). 
5 It represents the average of the five lowest quotations of 19 types of cotton (Middling 1 -3/32’’) from the following origins: 
Australia, Brazil, China, Francophone Africa, Greece, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Spain, Syria, Tanzania, Turkey, 
the US and Uzbekistan (Baffes 2002). 
6  To address this problem, after years of debates, world cotton futures are planned to be listed on the ICE (Meyer 2015). But 
it still has to be seen if these contracts will be widely traded and hence will have enough liquidity to be used as a reference 
in price setting and for risk management. 
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that prices quoted by international traders have become more responsive to daily changes in 
futures prices (Plastina 2009). 
The rising importance of derivative markets – intertwined with the CotlookA-index – in cotton 
price setting is related to a policy shift with regard to the stabilization of export earnings in 
commodity exporting developing countries (Newman 2009). Interventions after the Second 
World War emphasized the stabilization of prices and export earnings through multilateral 
agreements such as buffer stocks and export quota in the context of ICAs and for cotton 
specifically national price stabilisation arrangements such as national commodity boards.7 
The period since the collapse of the ICAs has seen heavy promotion of private market-based 
risk management instruments, namely derivatives, particularly by the World Bank and other 
donors (World Bank 2011; Nissanke 2011). 
The importance of derivative markets in price setting is also related to international commod-
ity traders’ practices as the lead firms in cotton commodity chains (Figure 2) that handle the 
majority of internationally traded cotton (Larsen 2008; ITC 2013). International traders in-
creasingly prefer using ICE futures prices (in contrast to the Cotlook A-index) as a reference 
as they use derivative markets for hedging. For hedging to be effective (by taking the oppo-
site position to the physical position) physical prices have to reflect futures prices. This is 
done by either using fixed price forward or price to be fixed (PTBF) contracts8 with reference 
to futures prices. Forwards require the immediate counter transaction on derivative markets 
while PTBF contracts only requires hedging after prices have been fixed and allows for more 
sophisticated and flexible risk management. Thus, the latter type of contract allows for the 
most effective combination of physical trade and hedging. These trading practices have 
bound together futures prices with national export and producer prices on the ground. New-
man (2009) showed how the use of PTBF contracts together with hedging on derivatives 
markets opened up new possibilities for profitable hedging by international traders; the up-
shot being the transmission of price volatility to exporters in producer countries. 
                                                            
7 Alongside, the Compensatory Financing Facility of the IMF and the STABEX scheme of the EC were put in place to amelio-
rate the adverse effects of commodity export instability (Newman 2009). 
8  For PTBF contracts, a basis is agreed with reference to an ICE futures trading month with the buyer (or seller) agreeing to a 
volume and delivery date with the price being fixed at a later time. 
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Figure 2: Schematic of global cotton chains 
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4. National Market Structures and Transmission  
of Prices and Risks 
How price volatility is transmitted and how different actors operating at the various nodes of 
the cotton chain experience and negotiate prices depends critically on the national market 
structures in cotton producing countries. Hence, local marketing structures and price setting 
institutions and possibilities for PRM strategies both mediate the transmission of price risk 
and shift the distribution of rents along the chain. In the remainder of this paper, we present 
a comparative analysis of the ways in which global cotton prices are transmitted to local 
markets in relation to specific marketing structures and price setting institutions in the cotton 
sectors in Burkina Faso, Mozambique and Tanzania (Table 1) and distributional outcomes of 
this.  
4.1. National market structures in Burkina Faso, Mozambique and Tanzania 
The collapse of ICAs occurred concomitantly with the dismantling of national commodity 
marketing boards – remnants of colonial commodity marketing structures in SSA that were 
carried over to the post-independent era – under the auspices of structural adjustment. Cot-
ton marketing boards acted as a monopsony for the purchase of seed cotton under central-
ised marketing systems. In most cases, they also had a monopoly in primary processing 
(ginning), marketing and the provision of inputs to farmers (Larsen 2008). Producer prices 
were set in advance of the planting season and farmers were guaranteed output markets 
and fixed prices. Market reform processes in the 1980s and 1990s generally entailed disen-
gaging the state, facilitating greater involvement of the private sector and producer organiza-
tions, and ensuring greater competition in input and output markets. But this has taken place 
to varying degrees and there remains diversity in market organization across SSA as is evi-
dent from our three case studies (Delpeuch/Leblois 2011; Tschirley et al. 2008, 2009; Pelt-
zer/Röttger 2013).  
4.1.1. Burkina Faso 
Sofitex, the parastatal cotton company in Burkina Faso, operated historically with a monop-
sony in the purchase of seed cotton from farmers, an input supply-credit scheme and a sys-
tem of fixed national producer prices (Bassett 2008). Low cotton prices in the 1980s and 
1990s, together with high operating costs, resulted in growing farmers’ indebtedness and 
prompted gradual reforms in the late 1990s and 2000s. These reforms included the estab-
lishment of producer groups (GPs), formation of a farmers union (UNPCB), scaling back of 
state control of Sofitex, partial privatisation of two regional monopolies, establishment of an 
association of cotton companies (APROCOB), and creation of an inter-professional commit-
tee (AICB) to coordinate sector stakeholders (Kaminski et al. 2011). In the second half of the 
2000s the sector again experienced difficulties related to low cotton prices and the inflexible 
pricing mechanism which led to cotton companies incurring large losses (IMF 2014). In re-
sponse, the producer price mechanism was adopted to better align domestic and world mar-
ket prices. In addition, a new smoothing fund was established in 2007 (after a previous fund 
became insolvent) (Kaminski et al. 2009, 2011). The cotton sector today is organized 
through a concentrated regional concession system with strong state involvement in Sofitex9 
– which remains the largest of the three cotton companies in Burkina Faso, accounting for 
80 per cent of cotton production. The remaining 20 per cent of production is channelled via 
Faso Coton and Socoma. The international traders Reinhart and Geocoton own shares of 
                                                            
9 Sofitex is largely owned by the government (94.5 per cent) with the remaining shares by UNPCB (4.8 per cent) and limited 
shares by the international trader Gecoton (0.6 per cent) and local investors (0.1 per cent). Earlier, the government only 
owned 35 per cent, while 34 per cent were held by Dagris (now Geocoton), 30 per cent by UNPCB and 1 per cent by pri-
vate local investors. In 2007 Dagris was unable to fulfill its part of the recapitalization, obliging the government to increase 
its stake to 65.4 per cent and, in 2012, further on to 95.50 per cent (IMF 2014). Socoma is owned by Geocoton (75 per 
cent), UNPCB (13 per cent) and private local investors (12 per cent). Faso Coton is owned by the international trader Paul 
Reinhart (29 per cent), International Promotion Services (21 per cent), the Burkina transportation company SOBA (20 per 
cent), the fertilizer company Amerfert (20 per cent) and UNPCB (10 per cent). 
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Fasocoton as well as Sofitex and Socoma respectively. There remains a single channel 
marketing system. The cotton company operating in each region has ‘exclusive purchasing 
rights’ of all cotton in that region. At the same time, cotton companies ‘guarantee purchase’ 
of all the cotton that farmers in that region want to sell. As common in such a contract sys-
tem, cotton companies have to provide credit, inputs and extension services to farmers and 
are in charge of transport.  
A fixed price is set before the season that is identical in all cotton growing areas and fixed 
throughout the season. The so-called pivot price is negotiated amongst stakeholders within 
the AICB at the beginning of the season in April on the basis of a formula that aims to align 
producer prices with global prices. This formula includes the three year average CotlookA-
index and takes into account the conversion rate between seed cotton and cotton lint and 
standard processing costs (Goreux 2006; Bellù/Tortora 2010). Two unique features of the 
system in Burkina Faso are the two tier price system and the existence of a smoothing fund 
(fonds de lissage). In the two tier price system farmers are paid a floor price – 95 per cent of 
the pivot price less input costs received at the beginning of the season – on delivery of the 
seed cotton and a potential premium (ristourne) at the end of the season if the realized ex-
port price of cotton lint is above the floor price. The ex-post price of seed cotton is calculated 
using the average sales price during the season.10 The smoothing fund – managed by a 
commercial bank – is aimed at reducing price risks for cotton companies.11 The basic con-
cept is that farmers are subsidized in years when world prices are low, and the fund is re-
plenished in years when prices are high (Kaminski et al. 2011).  
4.1.2. Mozambique 
Since the early 20th century, the Mozambican cotton sector has been characterized by a 
concession system. Production is conducted by small holder farmers and, as in the last 
years of the colonial period, by large scale agriculture producers diversified across a number 
of commercial crops. Farmers were forced to plant cotton during the colonial period and pro-
duction declined significantly after independence and nationalization of concession compa-
nies in 1975. Despite the ongoing civil war, the sector recovered in the late 1980s with the 
formation of public-private joint venture companies with exclusive cotton buying rights within 
specific concession areas. With regained political stability and economic reforms in the early 
1990s, private companies were given new concessions which stimulated cotton production 
(Tschirley et al. 2008; Poulton et al. 2004). Today, the sector remains organized through a 
regional concession system involving private cotton companies only. As in Burkina Faso, 
cotton companies have a monopsony in their concession region. There are currently 11 pri-
vate cotton companies active in the sector. Among the largest are three international traders: 
Plexus (the largest player), Olam (the third largest) and China Africa (the fifth largest), ac-
counting for 38 per cent, 19 per cent and 8per cent of production respectively. Large inde-
pendent cotton companies include SANAM (nr. 2, 21per cent) and SAN/JFS (nr. 4, 9 per 
cent).  
The sector operates a national minimum price system for seed cotton. The minimum price is 
established by the government following a negotiated proposal by both the National Forum 
of Cotton Producers (FONPA) and the Mozambique Cotton Association (AAM) where cotton 
                                                            
10  The formula was changed by AICB in 2011 to not include the actual world market price over the whole selling period 
(around 14 months) but exclude two month periods where cotton companies sold less than 1 per cent of national produc-
tion to international traders. This led to the removal of some of the highest price months in 2010/11 when cotton prices 
reached its peak because cotton companies contracted to sell most of their cotton lint before the price surged. They would 
have occurred major losses if the price formula had not been adapted. This change led to major protests by farmers 
(Bloomberg 2011). A further critique is that the formula does not include actual sales prices but the Cotlook A-index which 
is in the case of Burkina Faso an under-representation of export prices, reducing the base for calculating producer prices 
(Bellù/Tortora 2010). 
11 Such funds were widespread in WCA but many experienced financial problems in the 1990s given the long period of low 
cotton prices and required re-financing (Dana/Sadler 2012). The French development agency AFD proposed that the EU 
should launch a pilot project for a new smoothing fund in Burkina Faso. The aim was to smooth prices but not to stabilize at 
an absolute level with prices negotiated based on a formula to align them with world-prices, and also with contributions to 
and support from the fund being determined by a formula to reduce political influence. 
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companies are represented. The proposed minimum price takes into account the mean of 
the Cotlook A-index in the previous month, the exchange rate, the quality differential of 
Mozambican cotton lint compared with the A-index, freight and insurance costs, the conver-
sion rate between seed cotton and cotton lint, other levies and costs, and the share received 
by producers which varies from 50 to 55 per cent (IAM 2014). As the other variables are 
largely given, negotiations focus on the share going to farmers and cotton companies. The 
minimum price is set in April/May, between six weeks and two months in advance of cotton 
marketing. In 2007 the system was amended by an indicative price that was agreed upon by 
cotton companies and farmers in October/November, seven to eight months prior to pur-
chasing and before planting. The intention of this indicative price is to assist farmers in plant-
ing decisions. However, the binding minimum price is only agreed in April/May and the indic-
ative price is subject to change (Dias 2012). To date, there has not been a downward revi-
sion of the indicative price. In contrast to Burkina Faso, there is no binding supplementary 
payment if actual prices come to be higher than the minimum price; there is also no stabilisa-
tion fund. 
4.1.3. Tanzania  
The Tanzanian cotton sector was liberalized in 1993. Before this all cotton processing and 
domestic marketing was handled by cooperative unions and primary societies. The Tanzania 
Cotton Marketing Board (TCMB) handled all exports. In light of the sectors’ inefficiencies, the 
Cotton Act of 1994 opened up cotton ginning and marketing to competition. Fixed producer 
prices were abolished and output and input markets were liberalised. Although the share of 
export prices received by farmers increased following reforms, liberalization resulted in the 
collapse of the credit and input supply system causing declines in both the level and quality 
of production (Larsen 2008; Gibbon 1999; Baffes 2004; Bargawi 2008). In view of the prob-
lems of input provision and quality, the state, via the Tanzania Cotton Board (TCB), renewed 
its engagement in the sector in the Cotton Act 2001 (Bargawi 2008). Today, the sector re-
mains open to competition with no restrictions on farmers’ and ginners’ choice of trading 
partners.There are a large number of private companies active in purchasing, ginning, and 
selling, leading to considerable competition. Since liberalisation, there has been considera-
ble entry and exit of private ginners while cooperative unions still make up the largest share 
of ginning capacity. More than 60 ginneries are registered with the TCB but only around 40 
are active (in 2012/13). The top five account for only 40 per cent of total seed cotton pur-
chase and they typically change from year to year (Tschirley et al. 2009; Salm et al. 2011). 
There is only one international trader involved in ginning (Olam, around 10 per cent of pro-
duction) and few large players.  
After liberalization, fixed prices were replaced by indicative prices that are not binding –
although transactions below the indicative price would contravene the Cotton Act of 2001. 
TCB sets the indicative price for each season based on a stakeholder consultation process 
in May which involve the associations of cotton buyers (TCA) and farmers (TACOGA). In 
their price proposals, TACOGA considers production costs, TCA considers costs incurred in 
buying and processing of seed cotton, transportation and related taxes and levies while the 
TBC uses 60 per cent of the world market price (Ngaruko/Mbilinyi 2014). Indicative prices 
are announced before the opening of the official marketing season in June but can be re-
vised subsequently. The price-setting group reconvenes as necessary to adjust the price in 
response to world-price fluctuations (Salm et al. 2011). For instance, in 2011, the indicative 
prices started at 1,100Tsh but declined to 800TSch per kilogram (Ngaruko/Mbilinyi 2014).12 
 
  
                                                            
12 A new system is planned to be implemented where the government will refrain from setting indicative prices but will inter-
vene through a Crop Price Stabilization Fund to support farmers that have problems replaying loans when prices fall below 
a certain level (Bariyo 2014). 
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Table 1: Price setting in Burkina Faso, Mozambique and Tanzania  
 Burkina Faso Mozambique Tanzania 
Administered price yes (fixed price) yes (minimum price) no 
Panterritorial & pan-
seasonal price 
yes yes no 
Linked to global price yes yes yes 
Announced prior to 
planting 
yes yes (since 2007) no 
Announced/Adjusted 
prior to harvesting 
no yes but no downward 
revision yet 
yes but subject to 
changes (indicative 
price) 
Secondary payment 
after marketing 
yes no no 
Stabilisation fund yes no no 
How is price set? Negotiated within  
interprofessional  
committee (govern-
ment, cotton compa-
nies and farmers) 
Negotiated  
between  
government, cotton 
companies and farm-
ers 
Competitive  
market price, indicative 
price negotiated be-
tween government, 
cotton companies and 
farmers  
Source: Adapted from Tschirley et al. 2009. 
4.2. Inter- and intra-seasonal price volatility 
The world price of cotton is transmitted to the three case study countries via the practices of 
price-setting discussed above. Whist the Cotlook A-index remains as the key indicator in-
forming the negotiated price via the various price-setting institutions, there has been a reori-
entation towards the ICE futures/New York market price owing to the centrality of futures 
prices as they are tied to the hedging strategies of international cotton traders. Hence, ICE 
futures have increasingly become the benchmark around which export prices are negotiated. 
Related to this, there have been discussions in Burkina Faso and Mozambique to adopt the 
ICE futures price in calculating the fixed/minimum producer price. The following quotes are 
indicative of the responses from our interviews conducted with actors along the Tanzanian 
marketing chain: ‘New York is the benchmark on which to judge and decide upon prices’ 
(international trader); ‘The futures price is now by far the more important. It’s what everybody 
looks at as a price guide’ (local ginner); ‘Everybody is looking at New York futures’ (local 
agent). In this way, inter-seasonal variations in the world price are transmitted to each of the 
three case countries. 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the annual average export and producer prices in each of 
the three case countries together with the average A-index. During the period 2000–13, ex-
port prices followed the Cotloook A-index accounting on average for 105 per cent of the in-
dex in Burkina Faso, 101 per cent in Tanzania and 95 per cent in Mozambique. There are 
important differences in these countries that are largely related to quality considerations and 
also the bargaining position of cotton companies vis-à-vis international traders. But the im-
portant point is that yearly export prices follow the volatility of global prices. Correlation coef-
ficients show this close relation between global and export prices accounting for 83 per cent 
in Tanzania and 90 per cent in Burkina Faso and Mozambique for the period 2005 to 2014. 
Yearly realized producer prices also follow global price dynamics. Correlation coefficients 
between producer prices and the A-index are around 0.7 in cases of Mozambique and Tan-
zania. The use of a three year average of the A-index in calculating producer prices smooths 
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the price received by producers in Burkina Faso13 and we find a correlation index of 0.58. 
However, once the second payment is taken into account the coefficient increases to 0.87.14 
Figure 3: Cotlook A-index, export prices and producer prices (cotton lint price, US$/tonne) 
 
Source: Cotlook A-index from Cotlook; Export prices from UN Comtrade; Producer prices from MAFAP, FAO (compared with 
national sources – UNPCB in Burkina Faso, TCB in Tanzania and IAM in Mozambique); Exchange rate from WDI. 
Note: The export price value for 2003 is unrealistically low for Mozambique – hence, we excluded it from the analysis; A con-
version factor from seed cotton to cotton lint of 0.42 was assumed for all countries; Marketing year based on season in Burkina 
Faso. 
The share of farm gate prices15 in the Cotlook A-index is however systematically lower in 
Mozambique over the period 2005 to 2013 than in Burkina Faso and Tanzania accounting 
on average for 44, 58 and 55 per cent respectively. Hence, both the fixed price system in 
Burkina Faso and the competitive system in Tanzania delivered producer prices that ac-
counted for a higher share of the world and export price compared to Mozambique.16 While 
the price system in Mozambique also secures a minimum producer price the share of the 
world price going to farmers is comparatively low as there is no secured post-seasonal pre-
mium paid to farmers and realised prices do not deviate greatly from minimum prices. An 
issue in all three systems is the concentration and market power of international traders and 
their close ties with cotton companies operating domestically in the context of increased ver-
tical integration in the three countries17. The income share received by international traders 
is not considered in negotiations of fixed, minimum or indicative prices. The increased role of 
                                                            
13 The smoothing effect in Burkina Faso declined however from using the seven to the five to currently the three year average 
Cotlook A-index. 
14  For the period 2005/06 to 2013/14, the realized producer price in Burkina Faso exceeded the floor price in five out of nine 
years due to positive export price developments during the season.  
15 For comparative reasons we convert national farm gate prices in US Dollars which eliminates exchange rate movements 
from the analysis. Shares are further calculated using the world average conversion factor of 0.42 from seed cotton to cot-
ton lint. In reality these conversion factors are different given the different cost structures and productivity of ginners. Of 
course, such a simple inter-country price comparison is complicated, particularly given differences in production and 
transport cost structures, in taxes and levies and in ginning conversion factors in the countries in addition to exchange rate 
issues. But it still serves as an indicator of alignment between global and national prices in the three countries. 
16 This questions the competition-coordination trade-off (see f.e. Tschirley et al. 2009) as purchasing prices in fixed price 
systems are not generally lower in terms of farmers’ share of world market prices than in the competitive system in Tanza-
nia. 
17  Vertical integration has been a well-known phenomenon in WCA where some traders hold minority or majority shares in 
cotton companies due to the French heritage. In ESA, this emerged particularly in the last decade in order to secure supply 
(ICT 2013).  
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international traders at the ginning stage also questions whose interests are served in price 
negotiations between cotton companies and primary producers (Bellù/Tortora 2010).18 
Differences exist across the three countries with respect to intra-seasonal price volatility. 
While minimum price systems operate in both, there are differences between Burkina Faso 
and Mozambique regarding the time of price fixation (Figure 4). In Burkina Faso, prices are 
fixed in advance of planting which helps to stabilize farmers’ incomes by reducing uncertain-
ty in planting decisions. In Mozambique, there are two price fixing meetings – one before the 
planting season and one before marketing starts where prices may be changed. Farmers are 
thus, in theory, exposed to changes in the worldprice that occur between the meetings.19By 
contrast, the nonbinding indicative price in Tanzania is announced at the start of the market-
ing period with the possibility of revision within the season. World price movements are thus 
transmitted to Tanzanian producers within a season and constitute a major concern for 
farmers. This is exemplified in the following quote: ‘If NY goes up, you‘ll see the price goes 
up as well in the field. And if next day NY price goes down, you‘ll see the price going down 
later that day in the field’ (local ginner).In addition to global price fluctuations, producer price 
movements in Tanzania exhibit a seasonal pattern. The price of seed cotton rises gradually 
throughout the season before dipping at the very end of the marketing period. This phenom-
enon has the effect of increasing inequality amongst farmers since only relatively financially 
secure farmers have the resources to wait and store cotton. Inequality in prices received 
also has a geographical dimension as the frequency of buyer visits and level of buyer com-
petition varies widely between remote and more centrally located buying posts (Bargawi 
2008).  
Figure 4: Timing of producer price setting in Burkina Faso, Mozambique and Tanzania 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Mwinuka/Maro (2012) for Tanzania, ITFC-IDB (2014) for Burkina Faso, and Textile-in-depth 
(2009) for Mozambique; and World Cotton Calendar (ICAC 2015). 
Note: In Tanzania cotton is produced in Western and Eastern zones with the former accounting for up to 99% of production. 
Dates are therefore only shown for the Western zones. 
                                                            
18  Prices paid to affiliates may be set lower than those actually received on international markets by international traders, 
generating profits downstream by shifting losses upstream. 
19 In practice, there has been no downward revision of prices following the second meeting to date. 
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4.3. Who bears price risks and how are they managed? 
Price risks can be differentiated into inter-seasonal and intra-seasonal price risks. The first is 
largely born by farmers in all three countries as producer prices closely follow world cotton 
prices through adoption of market-based producer price setting mechanisms in competitive 
system as well as in regulated systems where price formulas have increasingly been based 
on world-prices. Hence, in all three market structures, producers bear the brunt of inter-
seasonal price instability. In Burkina Faso, there is a slight smoothing effect resulting from 
the pricing formula that takes into account world prices over the past three years. In the face 
of price uncertainty, diversification across crops is often the only coping strategy open to 
farmers. This is more effective in Burkina Faso compared with Mozambique and Tanzania 
as farmers know the guaranteed minimum price in advance of planting.  
The extent to which different actors in the cotton system experience intra-seasonal price 
volatility depends upon the price-setting institutions and the existence of a stabilization fund. 
Figure 5describes different local actors’ exposure to intra-seasonal price risks in the three 
countries. In Tanzania, farmers are exposed to world price volatility over the whole season 
although this is, in part, tempered by the system of indicative price setting at the start of the 
marketing season. Since cotton companies can pass on a portion of world price movements 
to producers, the price risk they face on this side of the transaction is limited. In Mozam-
bique, intra-seasonal price variation between planting and marketing is formally born by 
farmers. Once marketing begins, the minimum price system effectively transfers the risks 
associated with world price movements to cotton companies. In Burkina Faso, price risks are 
born by the cotton companies over the whole season as prices are fixed before planting. The 
smoothing fund partly compensates cotton companies should prices decline during the sea-
son. Neither cotton companies nor farmers benefit in total from positive world price move-
ments during the season since they must contribute a part to the fund to ensure a balanced 
budget in the long run. Ultimately, the burden of price risk falls on the government since it 
has a mandate to re-capitalise the fund should it be drawn down over an extended period of 
price decline, as occurred in 2007 (IMF 2014).  
The PRM strategies employed by different actors along cotton chains depend, on the one 
hand, upon their exposure to world price movements, which are in turn conditioned by the 
institutional context and position along the chain, and on the other hand, their ability to un-
dertake different PRM strategies. PRM strategies may be classified as physical or financial. 
Physical PRM strategies involve influencing the time of selling through storage, back-to-back 
trading that shortens the time that the actor has possession of cotton, and fixed price forward 
contracts.20 Financial strategies involve hedging through futures and options on commodity 
derivative markets (Dana/Sadler 2012). Figure 5also gives an overview on the ability of dif-
ferent local actors to mitigate intra-seasonal price risks in the three countries. In general, 
farmers have very limited access to PRM strategies. In the first place, storage and insurance 
costs are high and there is very limited access to affordable credit (Bargawi 2008). Only the 
wealthiest farmers are able to choose the time when they sell cotton. As the producer of cot-
ton, farmers have no possibility of selling back-to-back. Nor are forward contracts typically 
available since, in all three countries, the cotton marketing season is fixed by government, 
and transactions conducted in cash. Hedging instruments are completely out of reach to 
farmers owing to the huge costs involved and the relatively large contract sizes. 
Cotton companies bear the largest price risk over the season in Burkina Faso and Mozam-
bique. The capacity of cotton companies to manage such price risks varies depending on 
their size and expertise but most importantly if they are affiliated to international traders. 
Shareholders of cotton companies include international traders such as Geocoton and Rein-
hart in Burkina Faso, Plexus, Olam and China Africa in Mozambique and Olam in Tanzania. 
                                                            
20  There are also longer term strategies such as switching to niche and speciality product markets that are less affected by 
world-price instability and diversification through selling a larger variety of products or increasing local processing. 
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International traders generally hedge all or most of their trades on derivative markets through 
their headquarters which have specialized financial units. Independent local cotton compa-
nies do not engage in hedging as this is seen as too costly, risky and complex – even more 
so in the context of financialization – and requires access to information, financial resources 
and brokerage services.21 Further, trading on derivative markets is not adapted to the con-
texts of local actors in producing countries – for instance are the volumes of local producers 
and exporters often very small compared to lot sizes in futures markets. Though changes 
such as electronic trading have reduced transaction costs, other costs of hedging, such as 
financial requirements and time needed to monitor market developments have increased. A 
particular problem is the increasing short-termism of trading and the related intra-day volatili-
ty of commodity prices which leads to more frequent and unpredictable margin calls requir-
ing permanent access to finance. For actors that do not have financial units and the re-
sources and capacities to interact actively with derivative markets and weather any losses 
associated with sudden adverse price changes, hedging has become an even more difficult 
risk management instrument. Even Sofitex, the largest state-owned cotton company in SSA, 
does not use futures or options as hedging is seen as complicated and expensive and not 
part of their business focus on the physical market.22 
Independent local cotton companies – including large companies such as Sofitex in Burkina 
Faso, smaller private companies that dominate in Mozambique and Tanzania – are restrict-
ed to physical price risk strategies most importantly selling at different points in time through 
fixed-price-forward contracts. Forward sales lead to production risks as sales are often 
signed when actual production levels cannot be predicted which may lead to oversold situa-
tions. Hence, international traders only buy forward from ginneries if they are confident that 
volumes can be guaranteed (ITC 2013). This is the case for all three cotton companies in 
Burkina Faso and the majority of companies in Mozambique where forward sales are used 
extensively, both to manage price risks and as collateral for input credit provision. In Tanza-
nia, larger ginners can also sell forward to international traders. But smaller independent 
ginners are generally not in a position to guarantee the volume and the quality of their pro-
duction before it is ginned or store lint for extended periods. They primarily deal with price 
risks by trying to secure large margins and adjusting their buying price over the course of the 
season – a strategy they can pursue as there is no administered price and hence prices can 
be passed on to farmers – and selling the lint as it is ginned.  
Hence, access to hedging gives multinational actors, i.e. international traders, and their local 
affiliates an important advantage in dealing with price risks relative to local actors in produc-
ing countries (Dana/Gilbert 2008). However, this impact goes beyond price security as 
commodity derivative markets are not only used for hedging but also speculatively. Particu-
larly large multi-commodity international commodity traders, far from concerned with the in-
creasing presence of financial investors on these markets, have made speculative deriva-
tives trading an important part of their business strategy, opening expanded profit opportuni-
ties. By contrast, smaller, traditional cotton traders have largely remained focused on physi-
cal trading activities with limited expansion into financial services. 
  
                                                            
21 High costs accrue not only for purchasing the contracts themselves but also for financing margin calls. Futures require 
margins that are adjusted on a daily basis to reflect market movements. Financing become necessary when oscillations in 
the current price fall outside the margin that is set below the original purchase price by the futures contract. Financing mar-
gin calls can be very expensive and requires permanent access to financial resources. A problem of options is that the 
premium is expensive compared to futures contracts (ITC2013). 
22  In Tanzania, the World Bank and CRDB promoted hedging through its “Kinga Ya Bei” project with very limited uptake 
(Newman 2009). 
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Figure 5: Intra-seasonal price risk and PRM ability for farmers and cotton companies 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
5. Conclusions 
Price instability is a major concern particularly for small holder farmers and for independent 
local cotton companies that have limited access to risk management strategies. Given the 
liberalization of price stabilization schemes in producer countries and international traders’ 
practices, particularly the use of hedging, commodity derivative markets have become the 
central pricing mechanism for international cotton trade with futures prices being increasingly 
transferred along the commodity chain to exporters and producers. This is particular prob-
lematic given the increased short-termism in derivatives trading that amplifies both the size 
of price swings as well as their frequency. 
The extent to which unstable world prices are transmitted to producers depends upon the 
national market structure, and price setting in particular. Inter-seasonal price instability is a 
reality in all countries studied since national prices are based on, and increasingly aligned to, 
global prices. This is the case under competitive price setting, as in Tanzania, as well as in 
administered price setting systems such as in Burkina Faso and Mozambique. Within sea-
sonal price volatility is a greater concern for farmers in Tanzania than in Burkina Faso and 
Mozambique where this price risk is largely born by cotton companies. The latter two coun-
tries have different types of national producer price stabilization schemes in place that pro-
tect farmers from intra-seasonal price volatility and allow them to secure a certain degree of 
price security over the season. Burkina Faso further has a smoothing fund that mitigates 
price risks faced by cotton companies. In the liberalized system in Tanzania global price fluc-
tuations within the season are also transmitted directly to producers. 
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Local actors have minimal possibilities to pursue market based PRM given the high costs 
and risks involved. Only ginners affiliated to international traders hedge most of their trades 
through their headquarters which have specialized financial units. Farmers have few alterna-
tive PRM options available other than adapting their production volumes from season to 
season. In Burkina Faso and Mozambique cotton companies can sell through fixed price 
forward contracts to international traders – a PRM option that smaller ginners in the frag-
mented and competitive system in Tanzania rarely have as they cannot guarantee volumes 
and quality to international traders. 
Uneven exposure to price instability and access to PRM strategies have important distribu-
tional implications. Whilst international traders have the capacity to deal with price risks 
through hedging in addition to expanding their activities and profit possibilities through pursu-
ing financial trading strategies and providing financial services on commodity derivative mar-
kets, local actors in producer countries face the challenge of price instability and increased 
short-termism with very limited access to risk management. Financialization has given rise to 
opportunities and challenges for actors in the cotton commodity chain and, given the hetero-
geneity of actors, has tended to exacerbate existing inequalities in cotton trading. Large in-
ternational and financially adept actors stand to gain from opportunities for speculation 
alongside hedging activities on derivative markets while local actors in producer countries 
face greater challenges in an environment of price instability and short-termism (Newman 
2009). 
National market structures can mediate uneven exposure to price risk and risk management 
but only to a certain extent. National structures can address and mediate local relationships 
and power asymmetries in producer countries to a certain degree by negotiating how price 
risks are shared amongst actors operating in the national marketing system. The national 
institutional context, particularly tripartite negotiation structures and processes and strong 
independent farmers’ unions or associations are crucial for outcomes that reflect farmers’ 
interests. National structures alone however cannot fully address the major driver of intra-
chain inequality in incomes and risks, namely, unequal power structures in global commodity 
chains – the dominance of international traders, in particular, and their increasing links to 
commodity derivative markets. Through acting on these markets they are in a position to 
determine prices along the cotton chain, to cope with price risks and to expand their financial 
activities and profit avenues.  
In light of these conclusions policy reforms are necessary at least at four levels – regulation 
of commodity derivative markets to reduce the dominance of financial investors and financial 
motives (Staritz/Küblböck 2013); development of alternative physical price determination 
beyond commodity derivative markets and the highly intertwined and international trader-
determined Cotlook A-index such as an adapted version of collective price agreements that 
were created by ICAs; establishment of national price stabilization schemes to ensure fair 
and stable prices in producer countries for exporters and farmers; and reduction of depend-
ence on international traders through developing marketing and trading capacities in pro-
ducer countries and through furthering local and regional processing. Current efforts by 
some international organizations to deal with price risks of farmers and exporters in producer 
countries through extending their access to hedging instruments is certainly not the policy 
answer. Commodity derivative markets are not an effective way to cope with commodity 
price risks for an important group of physical traders and particularly local actors in develop-
ing countries. Such efforts would intensify the impact of financialization on commodity chains 
and the uneven distributional implications discussed in this paper.  
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